Using a worldwide bank sample from 2000 to 2010, this article analyzes the determinants of bank lending behavior during the global financial crisis highlighting the role of bank capital. It reveals that the high quality of the bank funding strategy (tier 1 bank capital and retail deposits) and prevalent government backing were crucial to continuous bank lending during the crisis period. This effect was especially pronounced in non-OECD and BRIC countries. We also point out that, although higher use of tier 2 capital and interbank deposits could be important for increased lending during a normal period, this did not support lending activities during the financial crisis. The article concludes by suggesting that in crisis periods high-quality bank capital is a bank's competitive strength.
Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2008-2012 was propagated through the banking systems across the world and triggered unprecedented consequences for the global economy.
The regulators pushed for enhanced regulation, incorporated in the revised, Basel III capital regulatory framework (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010) . As Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, put it, "this framework would require banking organizations to hold more and higher quality capital . . . improving the resilience of the U.S. banking system in times of stress, thus contributing to the overall health of the U.S. economy."
2 In Europe, Andrea Enria, chairman of the European Banking Authority, hailed improved capital positions of European banks by noting that "European banks are now in a stronger position, which should support lending to the real economy . . ." 3 In contrast, bankers strongly objected to this reasoning. Vikram
Pandit, former CEO of Citigroup, argued that "double-digit ratios will undermine lending, slow capital formation, lower demand and restrict growth." 4 This article empirically evaluates whether bank funding structure affects bank lending and, in particular, whether the quality of bank capital matters for lending growth. In line with the Basel accords, we distinguish between high-quality bank capital-that is, tier 1 capital with the highest loss-absorbing capacity-and supplementary tier 2 bank capital with a lower loss-absorbing capacity.
We use annual financial data for banks worldwide from 2000 to 2010 to discern the relationships between bank lending and bank capital in normal times and during the global financial crisis. Figure 1 provides the first inspection of the role of bank capital for bank lending activity. In Figure 1 , banks are split in quartiles according to their tier 1 capital ratio (tier 1 capital per risk-weighted assets). This shows that lending grew faster for banks with a high tier 1 capital ratio (a tier 1 capital ratio in the highest quartile) than for banks with a low tier 1 capital ratio.
<Insert Figure 1 here>
Our findings provide support for the hypothesis that higher quality of the bank funding side (i.e., a high tier 1 bank capital ratio, high proportion of customer deposits, and prevalent government support) better supports bank lending during crisis times. We find that the tier 1 capital ratio positively affected bank loan growth during the global financial crisis, and this relation is particularly strong within the subsample of non-OECD countries and BRIC countries. This indicates that the tier 1 capital ratio helps banks overcome periods of distress and maintain or even intensify their lending activity, especially for developing countries. In contrast, we generally do not find tier 2 capital to have been statistically significantly related to lending growth during the global financial crisis, potentially indicating that tier 2 capital does not provide adequate support for bank lending activities during a financial crisis.
Interestingly, we show that during the global financial crisis banks cut back on lending more if competing banks had high tier 1 ratios. This indicates that high quality capital strengthens the competitive position of a bank in a financial crisis. Our analysis confirms the findings in Berger and Bouwman (2013) from the U.S. banking sector and extends them to a global setting. In particular, Berger and Bouwman (2013) show that capital increases the survival probability and market share of banks. The effect occurs at all times for small banks and during banking crises for medium and large banks. Our evidence shows that small banks lent more if they had high levels of bank capital, whereas large banks lent more in the global financial crisis (but less in normal times) if their competing banks had low levels of bank capital. Hence, in a crisis, bank capital directly helps small banks whereas large banks gain a competitive advantage against weakly capitalized competitors.
Banks' funding risks may stem not only from insufficient levels of bank capital, but also from an inadequate structure of liabilities that banks took over in times of accelerated economic growth and the abundance of liquidity. We find some (limited) evidence that interbank deposits negatively affected bank lending during the global financial crisis. Banks tried to compensate for this by turning to more stable funding sources, such as retail deposits (European Central Bank, 2011) . We find some evidence that customer (retail) deposits were sticky and acted as a stable source of funding even during the global financial crisis. In particular, we show that customer deposits were positively related to loan growth during the global financial crisis.
During the crisis, banks were largely supported by the governments to overcome refinancing difficulties. We control for various aspects of ownership and indirect government support. We find a positive impact of government ownership (and evidence for a negative impact of foreign ownership) on bank loan growth during the global financial crisis. This points to the benefits of government ownership in mitigating the credit crunch. 5 Commercial banks and foreign-owned banks cut back bank lending during the global financial crisis, but this effect was statistically significant only for a subsamples of non-OECD and BRIC countries, but not for EU and OECD countries.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we look at previous studies and define the main hypotheses. In Section 3 we describe our data. In Section 4
we present the empirical model. Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Section 6 provides several robustness checks. Section 7 concludes the article.
Previous Studies and Development of Hypotheses
Literature on the impact of bank capital structure on bank lending was scarce prior to the global financial crisis from 2008 to 2010 and did not distinguish between tier 1 and tier 2 capital. For example, De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) analyze micro and macro determinants of multinational bank lending, but consider an aggregate equity-to-totalassets ratio to account for the solvency of individual banks. Gambacorta and Mistruli 5 Although several studies points to the inefficiency of government ownership and benefits of foreign ownership on bank efficiency (see, e.g., Berger, Hasan, and Zhou, 2009; Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel, 2005a, 2005b; Shen and Lin, 2012; Shen, Hasan, and Lin, 2014) , others stress the negative impact of foreign ownership on the quality of governance (e.g., Lensink, Meesters, and Naaborg, 2008) or analyze alternative institutional forms (e.g., Columba, Gobacorta, and Mistrulli (2009, 2010) argue that mutual guarantee institutions may alleviate access to finance for SMEs).
(2004) analyze the role of capital in bank lending behavior and find that wellcapitalized banks can better shield their lending from monetary policy shocks. Lending decisions of banks in relation to their capitalization are also addressed in studies by Admati, et al. (2010) and Jiménez, et al. (2012) , who observe that the global financial crisis negatively affected the lending activity of banks, especially those with low capital and liquidity ratios. Using a disaggregate measure we confirm that tier 1 bank capital (but not tier 2 bank capital) and retail or customer deposits positively affected continuous lending during the financial crisis.
Our article is closely related to one by Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) , which also highlights the positive effect of tier 1 capital on bank lending activities during the crisis (see also Brei, Gambacorta, and von Peter, 2013) . 6 Whereas these studies focus on selected advanced economies, we extend some of their perspectives to include worldwide data from 131 countries because our focus shifts beyond the biggest banks,
given that the overwhelming majority of European and U.S. businesses are dependent on loans from smaller banks and their subsequent relationships (see Hancock and Wilcox, 1998; Berger, Hasan, and Klapper, 2004) . In addition, non-listed smaller banks faced greater difficulties in finding additional funding sources on the market during the financial crisis. Therefore, the role of tier 1 for lending of all banks (and especially small ones) during the global financial crisis warrants further scrutiny. As reported earlier, our analysis confirms that tier 1 capital is of particular importance for smaller banks.
We build the analysis around four main hypotheses related to the role of 1) tier 1 capital, 2) tier 2 capital, 3) various categories of deposits, and 4) a competitive environment, including tier 1 capital of competing banks. We distinguish between periods before and after the global financial crisis, as well as control for ownership when investigating bank credit dynamics.
6 Berrospide and Edge (2010) analyze lending by the U.S. Bank Holding Companies to confirm a positive but small effect of bank capital on lending. Cornett et al. (2011) analyze the relationship between credit supply and liquidity and capital positions of all U.S. commercial banks during the global financial crisis. They focus on liquidity risk management and do not distinguish between different types of bank capital. Carlson, Shan, and Warusawitharana (2013) develop a novel empirical matching strategy to confirm the positive relationship between capital ratios and bank lending in the U.S. during the global financial crisis.
In relation to our first key hypothesis, we investigate whether and how different types of bank capital affected bank lending in normal times and during the global financial crisis. The first role of bank capital is to serve as a buffer to absorb banks' losses and insulate banks from insolvency. The purpose of holding additional capital for banks above the required regulatory level is to protect banks against large losses during a cyclical downturn and reduce the risk of insolvency (Rajan, 1994; see also Ayuso, Perez, and Saurina, 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008 The second role of bank capital is to act as an incentive device that can commit banks to prudent behavior by reducing the attractiveness of risk-taking. Banks are highly leveraged institutions that operate with a broad safety net (e.g., deposit insurance schemes and implicit government bailout guarantees). This exacerbates risk-taking by bank managers and shareholders, who bet on high returns knowing that losses are primarily subsumed by debt holders and taxpayers. Only a sufficiently high level of capital puts the skin of the bankers and shareholders into the game and induces prudent lending behavior (see VanHoose, 2007; Goodhart, 2013) .
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If bank capital acts as an incentive device, we can make the following prediction regarding bank capital and lending behavior. To the extent that excessive lending growth is a sign of risky lending behavior (see Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Foos, Norden, and Weber, 2010) , well-capitalized banks will engage in more prudent behavior and therefore will expand their lending less than weakly capitalized banks.
7 Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996) analyze the relationship between franchise value and risk-taking in banking. In line with Keeley (1990) , they show that banks with high franchise values have much to lose in insolvency. Consequently, the high-franchise-value banks hold more capital and take on less risk than banks with lower franchise value in order to prevent insolvency from occurring. Banks' risk-taking may be driven by the banks' business models (Altunbas, Manganelli, and Marques-Ibanez, 2011) or by the macroeconomic environment (e.g., an extended period of low interest rates; see Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibanez, 2012, or market power; see Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss, 2009 ) and may be mitigated by recapitalization measures or regulatory interventions (Berger, et al., 2012) . Rather than on risk-taking in general, our focus is on the determinants of bank lending behavior.
The abundant literature on bank capital may have underestimated the importance of the quality of bank capital. This article focuses on the importance of the quality of bank capital for bank lending behavior. Our main hypothesis stresses that, all else being equal, banks with larger tier 1 capital ratios better overcame the global financial crisis and cut back on lending less than banks with smaller tier 1 capital ratios. In normal times, the positive effect of the tier 1 capital ratio on credit growth persists but is less Only a few articles analyze the difference between tier 1 bank capital and tier 2 bank capital. Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Merrouche (2011), for example, show that the positive association between stock returns and capital is significantly stronger for higher-quality (tier 1) bank capital than it is for lower-quality bank capital (tier 2) bank capital. Barrell et al. (2011) show that an increase in the overall capital adequacy ratio reduces the risk appetite of banks, and that the proportional increase of tier 2 bank capital, within a given capital adequacy structure, increases the risk appetite of banks (see also Ashcraft, 2008a On the other hand, core (retail customer) deposits serve as the most stable funding source for banks (Berlin and Mester, 1999; Song and Thakor, 2007) . The main explanation for this is that deposits are insured and that banks offer several other services and products to small depositors that effectively bind them in a long-term relationship with the bank. Banks may obtain economies of scale by combining assets and liabilities that are both subject to liquidity risk (Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2002) .
Pennacchi (2006) shows that deposit insurance can help banks hedge against liquidity risk. Core deposits then act as a stable funding source, especially if they are insured.
According to this view, banks with a large proportion of core deposits easily weathered the global financial crisis and needed to respond with a smaller decline in credit growth.
9
H3: The decline in bank lending during the global financial crisis was higher for banks with higher levels of interbank deposits and lower levels of customer deposits. Similarly, we control for the effect of the subsidiary status on bank lending behavior. Kashyap and Stein (1997) argue that local banks, especially if they are stand-alone in structure, are the least able to access liquidity when market liquidity conditions tighten.
This would predict that reduction in lending to firms and households during a crisis period is higher for domestic, stand-alone banks. International banks are usually able to borrow under significantly better conditions than smaller regional or local banks. Ashcraft (2008b) demonstrates that banks that are affiliated with a multi-bank holding company are less likely to experience financial distress because of capital injections by the parent company. Therefore, we expect subsidiaries to be able to rely on the financial assistance of their parent banks, which minimizes their refinancing risk and makes them more robust and also able to maintain credit activity during a crisis. We anticipate that the subsidiary status of banks was associated with stronger credit growth during the global financial crisis. Even when controlling for subsidiary status of a bank, we still anticipate that tier 1 capital ratio is positively associated with loan growth in the global financial crisis.
We also control for several additional factors that might be important for banks' credit growth. First, we control for bank risk taking by including loan loss provisions and by a measure for the tangibility of bank assets (fixed assets). Second, we control for the size of the banks and commercial and savings bank status. The difference in credit growth for smaller and larger banks also needs to be considered. Berger and Bouwman (2009) find that bank capital supports liquidity creation in large banks but not in small banks. Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen (2009) show that smaller and liquidity-constrained banks reject more loan applications during the financial crisis than larger and less liquidity-constrained banks. Small banks were the most vulnerable during the global financial crisis whereas large and multinational banks were more likely to remain stable and financially sound. In addition, their access to external capital markets facilitates replacement of lost assets (Kashyap and Stein, 1997) . Hau, Langfield, and
Marques-Ibanez (2013) provide evidence that large banks are also more favorably assessed by credit rating agencies which intensifies the too-big-to-fail problem.
In addition, government assistance may act as a substitute for bank capital (see Berger and Bouwman, 2013) . Several empirical studies find that banks increase their risktaking in the presence of public guarantees. For example, Hovakimian and Kane (2000) present the empirical evidence for higher risk-taking of banks in the presence of deposit insurance. Carletti (2008) and Gropp, Gruendl, and Guettler (2010) provide empirical support that banks take more risk if they have higher government protection.
More pronounced risk taking incentives may then affect bank lending behavior. Hence, we control for government support by computing a government bailout probability using a bank's Fitch Support Rating. Fitch Support Rating of a bank denotes the improvement of credit standing of the bank due to the implicit government guarantees.
For example, banks deemed too big to fail have strong Fitch Support Rating, while small(er) banks have weak Fitch Support Rating. We expect a more stable loan growth for banks with stronger external support and lower bailout probabilities. The effect of external support is also expected to have had a stronger impact during the global financial crisis.
Data Description
The data is collected from BankScope database. The data of each bank is double checked to make sure that there is no "double counting" and that the observation included in our analysis has all the information that is needed in the basic model. Our analysis focuses on the sample countries that have more than 10 observations in BankScope, and on banks that have at least two consecutive observations. The total number of bank observations is 4,106 during the period from 2000 to 2010, amounting to 16,621 bank-year observations. 10,11 Our sample consists of commercial, savings, and co-operative banks from 91 countries. 12 All of the data are inflation adjusted and expressed in USD.
The data in Bankscope is reported either on a consolidated basis or on an unconsolidated basis. We focus on unconsolidated data. Our decision to focus on 10 Banks in some countries (including Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Jamaica, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain and Sweden) changed the financial reporting standards from the local "GAAP" to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) during [2005] [2006] . In order to extend our sample period, we include in our sample banks that went through the change in the accounting standards. Thus, for some of the banks in our sample the data is reported according to the two different accounting standards -Local "GAAP" (before 2005 or 2006) and IFRS (after 2005 or 2006) . In order to control for that change, we use the fixed effect model and include the year dummy variables to control for the effect of the changes in the accounting standards in some countries in the sample period.. 11 Our sample does not seem to be prone to survivorship bias. The banks are included in the sample even if they exited the market (e.g. through bankruptcy, liquidation, or through M&A) during the sample period. In particular, 28% percent of banks (530 out of 1860) included in 2004 is no longer present in the sample in 2010. 12 See Table A .2 in the Appendix for the detailed information of the sample. unconsolidated data is driven by the premise that bank subsidiaries are separate legal entities that decide for their optimal lending policies and their choices are affected by their individual capital levels. Also the regulator in a particular country would demand from subsidiary banks to keep a sufficiently high level of capital on a subsidiary basis. 13 In Table 1 we present descriptive statistics of the variables for the total sample over the entire time period. In the first panel we present the results for bank-specific variables. The average value of total asset is $16.3 billion, but the size of the banks in our sample varies quite substantially. This implies that any analysis needs to account for the size effect. Gross loans amount to $8.76 billion, or more than 50% of the total assets for the average-sized bank, whereas loan loss provision has an average value of $73 million, or approximately 0.8% of the average value of gross loans. The fixed assets only account for $131 million, which is less than 1% of the total assets of the average bank.
Looking at the liability side of bank balance sheets, we find that customer deposits with an average value of $9.69 billion account for roughly 60% of the total assets of the average-sized bank. Interbank deposits with an average value of $2.11 billion account for roughly 13% of the total assets of the average-sized bank. Furthermore, an average value of $1.27 billion of total capital accounts for 7.8% of the total assets of the average-sized bank. The average value of tier 1 capital and tier 2 capital is $923 million and $316 million, respectively. We have eliminated bank-year observations with negative tier 1 capital ratio or negative total assets. The average values of tier1 capital per risk-weighted assets (TIER1) and tier 2 capital per risk-weighted assets (TIER2) are 16.4% and 1.6%, respectively. The average ratios of customer deposits to total assets (TCD) and interbank deposits to total assets (DEP) are 62.8% and 8.2%, respectively.
In the second panel of Table 1 we include two macroeconomic variables (GDP growth 13 The argument for using consolidated data might be that the largest banks that operate in multiple countries could relocate capital across their worldwide subsidiaries, especially during difficult times such as the global financial crisis. We partially control for this effect by including a subsidiary and foreign ownership dummies in our regression analysis. However, raising capital is difficult for any undercapitalized bank (Admati, et al., 2012) . Even subsidiary banks might have hard time to raise additional capital from their mother banks, especially if their mother banks were hit by the crisis as well. Generally, a more indepth analysis of this kind of linkages is left for future work.
and Interest rates) to control for the demand-side effects on loan growth. The average value for GDP growth is 2%. Variable Interest rate denotes an interest rate for prime bank customers in real terms.
We use two industry structure variables to control for the competitive environment in a given country (see the third panel of Table 1 ). Bank concentration is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares of asset for the three largest banks in a country. The HHI has wide variation in the sample, and the sample mean is 0.042 (see Table 1 ). For each bank, we also compute the average tier 1 capital ratio of competing banks within the same country, weighted by assets of these banks, and we denote it by COMPTIER1. The average value of COMPTIER1 is 7.4%.
<Insert Table 1 In the fifth panel of Table 1 , we report descriptive statistics of several dummy variables related to organizational and ownership characteristics of banks. Fifty-five percent of the banks in our sample are commercial banks, and 16% are savings banks. The rest are cooperative banks, real estate and mortgage banks, and specialized government credit institutions. In our sample, 3.1% of the banks are government-owned, and 17.1% are foreign-owned. Finally 9.5% of banks in the sample are bank subsidiaries.
In the sixth panel of Table 1 , we present Bailout probability, as defined in Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel (2010) . 14 Bailout probability measures the probability that a bank, upon having financial difficulties, is supported by the government. Bailout probability is calculated on the basis of the Fitch Support Rating variable, adjusted for potential government ownership in a bank. The average value of the variable Bailout probability is 0.52 indicating an average long-term rating above BB-. This means on average a moderate probability of government support due to uncertainties regarding the ability or propensity of the government. Table A .1 in the appendix summarizes the variables used, defines them, and describes the data sources.
<Insert Table 2 here>
The correlations between main variables are shown in Table 2 . We observe that size is significantly negatively correlated with credit growth and the tier 1 ratio, but significantly positively correlated with the tier 2 ratio and interbank deposits. Although not statistically significant, the correlation between size and total customer deposits is positive. The tier 1 ratio is significantly negatively correlated with the tier 2 ratio (it seems that the two act as substitutes) and total customer deposits as well.
Empirical estimation
The empirical model is designed to test whether banks with different levels and quality of capital changed their lending behavior differently during the global financial crisis compared to the non-crisis period. The model is the following: 
where: 
where N is the number of banks in the sample,
where T i is the number of years in the sample for bank i.
We estimate two types of specifications. First, we use the bank fixed effects model with robust standard errors and include year dummy variables to control for the heterogeneity and changes in unobservable features. 15 Second, we use an instrumental-variables estimator. We are concerned about the potential endogeneity of the tier 1 capital ratio in the fixed effects model. 16 In particular, the fast growth of bank lending may not be due to a high tier 1 capital ratio but because of other unidentified variables.
For example, an efficient bank may easily build up a high tier 1 capital ratio (through retained earnings) and grow fast at the same time. In contrast, an inefficient bank grows slowly and is not able to build up a high level of capital. To deal with this endogeneity we need to find valid instruments that are uncorrelated with the error term but correlated with our dependent variable.
We account for the potential endogeneity of our dependent variables 1 , −1 , and Kraay (1998), we employ a cluster-robust estimator (where clusters are defined at the level of banks) to account for within-cluster correlation of the disturbances.
The instruments are statistically significant at large in first-stage regression equations.
In particular, 1 , −1 is statistically significant (at 1%) and positively related to the first difference of 1 , −1 and negatively related (at 5% statistical significance) to the first difference of −1 . −1 1 , −1 is statistically significantly (at 1%) and positively related to the first difference of −1 1 , −1 and negatively related (at 5% statistical significance) to the first difference of −1 . In addition, tests for underidentification and weak identification (measured by the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM and Wald F statistic, Kleibergen and Paap, 2006 , and by the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, see Hall, Rudebusch, and Wilcox, 1996 ; see also Hall and Peixe, 2000) 16 The bank capital structure decision is endogenous and may depend on bank-specific variables and macroeconomic and regulatory conditions in a country (see Byoun, 2008; Gropp and Heider, 2011; Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Memmel and Raupach, 2010) . 17 Ashcraft (2008a) and Berger and Bouwman (2013) also employ tax rate as an instrumental variable. Alternatively, Billmeier and Nannicini (2012) employ a synthetic control approach to control for endogeneity issues in a cross-country study.
confirm the validity of the instruments chosen.
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Results
We start by looking at the basic setup, where "supply"-side credit factors (capital and deposits), individual bank controls (size, loan-loss provisions, tangibility), and "demand"-side credit factors (economic growth, interest rates) are included. We continue by adding 1) industry competition factors (concentration, capitalization of competitors), 2) bank ownership characteristics (foreign vs. domestic ownership, subsidiary status), 3) institutional and regulatory characteristics (stringency of capital regulation and the coverage of deposit insurance), and 4) indirect government support (bail-out probability).
"Supply"-side (funding) factors and credit growth: In the basic model (columns 1 and 6 in Table 3 ) we evaluate the impact of credit "supply"-side variables (capital quality and funding) and the effect of financial crisis on credit growth (lending behavior) in the total sample of banks.
<Insert Table 3 here>
The results reported in columns 1-5 in Table 3 indicate that the tier 1 coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. This points to a positive relationship between the highest quality bank capital TIER 1,t-1 and the credit growth ∆ log and it confirms our Hypothesis 1. Moreover, the interaction term constructed as a product of the tier 1 ratio and crisis dummy also demonstrates a positive relationship with loan growth. This supports the notion of tier 1 serving as a buffer and not an incentive mechanism for banks and is consistent with Hypothesis 1.
Tier 1 capital provides banks with a cushion to absorb banks' losses and insulates banks from the risk of bankruptcy. Banks with higher tier 1 capital ratio levels are less sensitive to their actual credit and liquidity risk exposures. Consequently, they could secure market funding and support credit growth even during the global financial crisis.
In contrast, banks with a low tier 1 capital ratio may face serious solvency and liquidity problems if a recession looms. Consequently, they needed to heavily cut back on lending in the global financial crisis. The positive effect of tier 1 capital ratio on credit growth and the reinforced effect during the financial crisis is consistent with Jiménez et al. (2012), who find that the banks, especially those with lower capital ratio levels, have a negative growth in lending activity.
Columns 6-10 in Table 3 present the results using the instrumental variables panel regression model. The main difference from the previous columns in Table 3 is that the coefficient tier 1 capital ratio becomes insignificant. However, the interaction term between tier 1 capital ratio and the crisis dummy is consistently highly significant and positively related to lending growth. This provides evidence that tier 1 capital was especially important in the global financial crisis, whereas it is not significantly related to bank lending in normal times. We assess the adequacy of instruments using a test of overidentifying restrictions. We employ Hansen's J statistic, which is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation issues. P-values of Hansen's J statistic show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. This points to the validity of the instruments.
Next, we turn to the effect of tier 2 capital on credit growth. We can find some evidence that tier 2 positively affects lending growth in normal times. Contrary to our expectations in Hypothesis 2, tier 2 capital had no significant effect on credit growth during the global financial crisis.
We also find some evidence that the type of bank deposits affects lending. In particular, customer deposits (TCD i,t-1 ) positively and significantly at 10% affected bank lending during the global financial crisis in almost all empirical specifications. This is in line with Hypothesis 3 and the view that (mainly insured) customer deposits acted as a stable source of funding during the global financial crisis. Our analysis also provides some evidence that interbank lending (DEP i,t-1 ) is positively associated with bank lending during normal times and negatively during the global financial crisis, although the statistical significance is less pervasive across different empirical specifications. This is consistent with our Hypothesis 3.
Looking at bank-specific control variables, the regression result suggests that bank size (TA i,t-1 ) affects bank lending behavior. The negative and significant TA i,t-1 coefficient indicates that in normal times larger banks experience lower credit growth rates than small banks. Other control variables are less statistically significant.
"Demand"-side factors and credit growth: In order to capture the effect of "demand" side factors on credit growth, we include annual GDP growth (GDP growth i,t ) and real interest rates to prime customers (Interest rate i,t ) in the model in Table 3 . Not surprisingly, the results suggest that credit growth is negatively correlated with the interest rate and positively correlated with GDP growth i,t .
19
Banking sector competition and credit growth: The effect of funding factors on credit growth may be driven by the level of competition and the overall structure of the banking industry. We therefore add a concentration variable ( , −1 ), the average capitalization of the competitors ( 1 , −1 ), and their interactive terms with a crisis dummy ( −1 , −1 and −1 1 , −1 ) as additional explanatory variables to the basic model (columns 2 and 7 in Table 3 ).
We observe a negative effect of the concentration index ( , −1 ) on credit growth (although insignificant) during normal times. Hence, we find very scant support for Hypothesis 4a. However, competitors' tier 1 capital ratios have a significantly positive impact on loan growth during normal times (i.e., the coefficient for 1 , −1 is significantly positive), but this coefficient reversed during the global financial crisis.
This points to the competitive advantage of high tier 1 capital ratios in the global financial crisis. In particular, banks grew more slowly in the global financial crisis if their competitors had high tier 1 ratios. In contrast, banks grow faster in normal times if 19 We also tested for alternative empirical specifications, which include a yearly change in interest rate and its interactive term with the crisis dummy as additional explanatory variables. Their impact on bank lending behavior was statistically insignificant in normal times and during the global financial crisis. Our other results remain largely unchanged. This confirms the importance of tier 1 capital put forward within the lending channel literature (see Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011). their competitors have high tier 1 ratios. In normal times, high tier 1 ratios may act as a competitive disadvantage. This provides support only for Hypothesis 4b.
The results regarding the effect of capital and deposits on credit growth are both qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to the basic model. This implies that our basic results are robust for the inclusion of the industry competition measures.
Regulatory environment:
The relationship between bank capital and bank lending behavior may be driven by cross-country differences, especially in the regulatory and institutional framework. We control for country-specific regulatory variables by adding measures of capital regulation stringency and deposit insurance. The relationship between funding variables ( 1 , −1 ) and bank lending remains unchanged. Our results provide evidence that banks cut back on lending more in the global financial crisis if capital stringency in the country was more pronounced. In addition, the growth of bank lending during the global financial crisis is much higher, if the deposit insurance in the country was more pronounced. The signs and statistical significance of other estimated coefficients largely corresponds with the ones in the basic model specification.
Bank ownership and credit growth:
We also account for the effect of various ownership aspects on credit growth during the global financial crisis. We therefore include as dependent variables dummy variables related to organizational structure and ownership of individual banks multiplied by the crisis dummy (see columns 3 and 8 in Table 3 ). We find a significant and positive effect of government ownership on credit growth in the global financial crisis. This corresponds to direct support of governments through ownership participation in banks. Government-owned banks could tap funding and support from governments during the global financial crisis and continue with their loan growth.
We also find empirical support for the negative effect of foreign ownership on lending growth during the global financial crisis. Finally, we find limited evidence that credit growth during the global financial crisis was affected by the organizational structure of the bank. That is, we find that a subsidiary bank cut back on lending less during the global financial crisis than a stand-alone entity. 20 Finally, we observe that the results regarding the effect of tier 1 capital on credit growth are both qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to the basic model. This implies that our basic results are robust for controlling for the bank organizational structure and ownership.
Indirect government support and the credit growth: During the financial crisis banks were largely supported by governments. It is therefore important to control for the impact of implicit government guarantees on lending activities. For this purpose, we include the variable Bailout probability that measures the probability that a bank is supported by the government (as defined in Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel (2010)).
We extend the basic model by including the interaction terms of Bailout probability with a crisis dummy. The results mainly show significant and negative effect of Bailout probability on credit growth during the global financial crisis. More importantly, the effects of capital on credit growth remain qualitatively similar to those in the basic model (although it becomes insignificant). 
Robustness checks
Subsamples of commercial banks: As a robustness check we also performed an analysis on the subsample of commercial banks only (see Appendix, see Table A. 3).
The results were largely unchanged. The crisis dummy is negatively and in most specifications significantly related to bank lending. This confirms the view that commercial banks needed to cut back on lending during the global financial crisis.
Subsamples of Banks in Different Regions:
Despite having wide-reaching effects on the global economy, the global financial crisis affected developed and developing countries differently. It is therefore interesting and warranted to perform the same analysis on the subsamples of banks in EU, OECD, non-OECD, and BRIC countries.
In particular, we are interested in whether the impact of tier 1 capital on bank lending is 20 Foreign subsidiaries of the same parent bank located in different countries are treated as different banks. 21 We also tested the robustness of our results using the alternative definition of the global financial crisis, where the year of the global financial crisis for each country is from Laeven and Valencia (2010). We find some (but less statistically significant) evidence that tier 1 capital ratio is positively related to lending growth during the global financial crisis.
unchanged in different world regions.
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<Insert Table 4 here> Table 4 reports the results in each region based on the fixed effects model and instrumental variable regression model.
In the subsample of banks in the EU and OECD countries, the impact of the tier 1 capital ratio and its interaction term with the crisis dummy is not always significant.
Within the subsample of non-OECD countries and BRIC countries, however, the impact of the tier 1 capital ratio on bank lending during the global financial crisis is positive and significant among all model specifications. This shows that during the global financial crisis a high tier 1 capital ratio was especially important for bank lending in developing countries (i.e., non-OECD and BRIC countries).
Interestingly, the role of commercial bank and foreign ownership for bank lending during the global financial crisis was significantly negative only for banks in the non-OECD and BRIC subsamples. This may indicate that commercial banks and foreignowned banks cut back bank lending during the global financial crisis only in developing countries.
Subsample of Banks According to Size and Funding:
The size of a bank plays a significant role in its ability to access financial markets in order to secure various types of funding for its operations, as well as to sufficiently diversify the riskiness of its assets and achieve certain economies of scale and scope. The question arises whether our findings are limited to the subsample of banks with a high (or low) tier 1 and tier 2 capital ratio, customer deposits, and interbank deposits. We therefore replicate our analysis on the subsamples of large and small banks by total assets (columns 1 and 2), banks with a high and low tier 1 capital ratio (columns 3 and 4), banks with a high and low tier 2 capital (columns 5 and 6), banks with high and low customer deposits 22 Brewer, Kaufman, and Wall (2008) , for example, show that capital ratios of banks not only depend on bankspecific variables, but also on country characteristics and policy variables. In addition, Berger et al. (2008) demonstrate that U.S. bank holding companies actively manage their capital ratios. One can therefore expect the relationship between capital and credit growth to be country-specific as well.
(columns 7 and 8), and banks with high and low interbank deposits (columns 9 and 10).
We report the results in Table 5 . For the purpose of brevity, we limit our estimation method to the fixed effects model.
<Insert Table 5 here>
Our analysis shows that the tier 1 capital ratio and its interaction with the crisis dummy is statistically significant for smaller banks but not for the largest banks. Small banks may be driven mostly by market forces and the impact of the global financial crisis on small banks may have been the highest. Therefore, high tier 1 capital ratio levels are the most important for small banks. In contrast, large banks may have been partially
shielded from the global financial crisis by implicit government guarantees. Their toobig-to-fail status may lower the importance of the tier 1 capital ratio.
In addition, the tier 1 capital ratio and its interaction term with the crisis dummy significantly affect bank lending for banks with a high tier 1 ratio, low tier 2 ratio, low customer deposits-to-total asset ratio, and low interbank deposits-to-total asset ratio.
This confirms the finding by Brei, Gambacorta, and von Peter (2013) , who show that bank capital supports lending, but only if it surpasses a critical threshold. Our analysis brings in the size effect. Looking back at Table 2 , it can also be noted that size is negatively correlated with TIER1 and positively correlated with TIER2, TCD, and DEP. Table 5 therefore indicates that the tier 1 ratio was important for bank lending behavior during the global financial crisis, especially for small banks.
Interestingly, the competitive environment significantly affects the lending behavior of large banks but not small banks. COMPTIER1 is significantly and positively relatedand COMPTIER1 t  is significantly and negatively related-to lending growth for large banks (and for banks with high tier 2, but low DEP), but its relation becomes insignificant for small banks (and for banks with a high tier 1 and TCD but with high DEP). That is, in normal times, large banks grow significantly faster if competing banks in the country have high tier 1 capital ratio, whereas during the global financial crisis large banks grew significantly faster if competing banks had a low tier 1 capital ratio. The explanation may be that high tier 1 capital ratio acted as a deterrent against the growth of large banks during the global financial crisis but acts as a competitive disadvantage during normal times.
To assess the reliability of our results, we also conduct a battery of robustness checks considering different subsamples and additional control variables (see Table A .4 in the Appendix).
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Subsamples of banks from different countries: First, to check that our results are not driven by countries with only a few observations, columns 1 and 2 in Table A .4 report the results of the subsample of countries with more than 50 observations. Second, Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel (2005b) show that data from Bankscope suffer from several problems, and are less accurate especially for transition countries from the former Soviet Republics. To check that our results are not driven by potential data problems, we perform an analysis on the subsample without banks from the former Soviet Republics (see columns 3 and 4 in Table A To check whether our main results are driven solely by the U.S. banks, we perform our analysis on the subsample of banks from non-U.S. countries (see columns 5 and 6 in 
Impact of Off-balance sheet activities:
The global financial crisis has highlighted the importance of off-balance sheet activities. Our major concern is that the off-balance sheet activities have potential effect on bank lending (e.g., through the pronounced risk-taking incentives; see Li and Marinč, 2014) given that many of the banks were 
Conclusion
In this article we examine the relationship between loan growth and bank capital structure. We analyze the impact of the type of bank funding on bank lending behavior in the global financial crisis. We distinguish between tier 1 and tier 2 capital and customer and interbank deposits as bank funding sources. We combine unbalanced panel data using annual balance sheet bank data between 2000 and 2010 with several variables discerning the macroeconomic environment, organizational and ownership structure, regulatory environment, and government support.
We find a significant and positive effect of the tier 1 capital ratio on bank loan growth during the global financial crisis. The effect seems to be more pronounced for small banks and for banks in non-OECD and BRIC countries. Customer deposits also positively affected bank lending during the global financial crisis. Furthermore, we find some (but weak) evidence that the tier 2 capital ratio and interbank deposits positively affect loan growth in normal times and that interbank deposits negatively affected bank lending during the global financial crisis.
Our evidence highlights a sharp contrast on the impact of different funding sources on bank lending during the global financial crisis. Whereas tier 1 capital and customer deposits acted as a stable source of funding during the global financial crisis, tier 2 capital and interbank deposits spur bank lending during normal times but did not do so during the global financial crisis.
We also find that during normal times a bank lends more if the tier 1 capital ratio of competing banks is high. This relationship reversed during the global financial crisis.
That is, during the global financial crisis a bank lent more if the tier 1 capital ratio of competing banks was low. The effect is present only for the subsample of large banks but not for small banks. This may indicate that large banks gained a competitive advantage against weakly capitalized competitors especially during the global financial crisis but not during normal times.
We also find that government ownership helped banks better sustained credit growth during the global financial crisis. Commercial banks and foreign-owned banks cut back bank lending during the global financial crisis, but this effect was statistically significant only in non-OECD and BRIC countries, but not in EU and OECD countries.
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